Trade Policy And Time Consistency In An Oligopsonistic World Market by Gervais, Jean-Philippe & LAPAN, HARVEY E
Economic Staff Paper Series Economics
11-1998
Trade Policy And Time Consistency In An
Oligopsonistic World Market
Jean-Philippe Gervais
Iowa State University
HARVEY E. LAPAN
Iowa State University, hlapan@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, International Business Commons, and the Taxation
Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economic Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gervais, Jean-Philippe and LAPAN, HARVEY E., "Trade Policy And Time Consistency In An Oligopsonistic World Market" (1998).
Economic Staff Paper Series. 304.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/304
Trade Policy And Time Consistency In An Oligopsonistic World Market
Abstract
This paper investigates the strategic behavior between countries that have purchasing power on the world
market for a certain good. Tariffs and quotas are not equivalent protection instruments in this oligopsonistic
market. Policy active importers would be better off by colluding and setting their trade instrument
cooperatively. In a non-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the
ex-ante optimal policy is not time consistent because the ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign export
supply curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. However, we show that the importers' inability to irrevocably
commit to their trade instrument may be welfare superior to the precommitment solution. The negative
welfare implication of noncooperative behavior may be balanced off by the welfare effect of the ex-post
elasticity. A numerical example is proposed to provide insights on the theoretical results.
Disciplines
Economic Policy | International Business | Taxation
This report is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/304
TRADE POLICY AND TIME CONSISTENCY
IN AN OLIGOPSONISTIC WORLD MAllKET
Jean-Philippe Gervais, Iowa State University
Harvey E. Lapan, Iowa State University
StaffPaper Series No. 310
November 1998
TRADE POLICY AND TIME CONSISTENCY
IN AN OLIGOPSONISTIC WORLD MARKET
by
Jean-Philippe Gervais
Graduate Research Assistant
Department ofEconomics
171 Heady Hall
Iowa State University
Ames, lA, 50011
Harvey E. Lapan, Professor
Department ofEconomics
283 Heady Hall
Iowa State University
Ames, lA, 50011
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non-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the
ex-ante optimal policy is not time consistent because the ex-post elasticity of the residual
foreign export supply curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. However, we show that
the importers' inability to irrevocably commit to their trade instrument may be welfare
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1 - Introduction
Much has been written on the theory of optimal tariffs (see Corden (1994) for a detailed
survey). However, aspointed out by Grant and Quiggin (1997), when there is more than
one country with world market power for a good, it raises strategic issues that have not
beenaddressed formally, but are obviously related to the problems of oligopoly theory.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, it investigates the
strategic behavior between countries that have purchasing power on the world market.
This strategic game between policy active importers has been introduced first by
Bergstrom (1982) and later by Karp and Newbery (1991,1992)\ We formalize the non-
equivalence of tariffs and quotas given the structure of the world market and the non-
cooperative behavior among importers. Importers set their trade instrument given the
optimal instrument set by the other importers. When the strategy space is restricted to the
use of a tariff, the Nash equilibrium entails lower tariffs for each country than in the
situation when they collude and act as a single monopoly importer. If the strategy space
is restricted to the use of a quota, the non-cooperative solution implies that a too large
quantity is imported in each country, thus driving the world price above the optimal level.
Each country would be better off by colluding and importing a smaller quantity.
The main contribution of this paper analyses time consistency issues. As pointed out by
Staiger (1995), time consistency problems and rules versus discretion issues have
occupied a major place in the macroeconomics and public finance literature, but less so in
' These papers analyze tlie strategic behavior between importers of a depletable resource. There is a
significant difference bet\veen the optimal tariff for an ordinary good compared to an exhaustible resource
such as oil. Oil is available in a fixed amount and, if costless to extract, its supply will be inelastic.
However, in a trade context, exports are not inelastic, i.e. there is a role for demand.
the international trade field. With a sufficient degree of discretion, an optimal trade
policy is bound to lack credibility because it is almost surely time inconsistent. Most of
the time consistency issues addressed in the economic literature emphasize the inferiority
of the no commitment solution.
We assume there is a lag between production and consumption, and that all countries can
change their policy between the two stages. For example, this setting applies to
agricultural markets with spring planting and fall harvest^. In the case oftariffs, the ex-
post(given production decisions) tariff will be higher than the ex-ante (before production
decisions are made) tariff because the residual export supply curve elasticity faced by
each country is lower ex-post. With perfect foresight, foreign producers will fully
anticipate the time consistent tariffand decrease their production accordingly. Therefore,
the lower ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign export supply curve may be welfare
increasing for the policy active importers compared to the ex-ante situation because of its
off-setting welfare effect with respect to the trade instrument competition. The same
argument also applies to the strategic quota game.
This paper is organized as follows. First, it provides a review of literature relevant to the
proposed problem to be studied. The theoretical model is set out in the second section to
address optimal trade policy and time consistency issues. Next, we develop a numerical
example to illustrate our various results. The last section provides concluding remarks
and suggests some extensions.
~For e.xample, tlie saine issue would arise if there was a lag between capital/investment decisions and labor
decisions.
2 - Review of Literature
According to the well-known theory of Johnson (1954), the optimal tariff for a large
country equals the reciprocal of the foreign export elasticity of supply. Lapan (1988)
points out that, in the case where production decisions are made before consumption and
trade decisions, and that the government can readjust its tariff between the two stages, the
st^dard optimal tariff will not be time consistent. From an ex-post perspective, i.e. once
production decisions are made, the foreign export supply elasticity is lower than the ex-
ante elasticity. Therefore, policy makers have an incentive to set ex-post tariffs at a
higher level than they would if they could precommit to the ex-ante tariff.
The foreign and domestic producers, knowing that the ex-ante tariff is not time consistent
will adjust their production accordingly {i.e. foreign production will be lower than if the
large country could precommit to the ex-ante optimal tariff) and both countries will be
worse off. The importance of the timing assumption is immediate once it is recalled that
a tariff can always be decomposed into a production subsidy and a consumption tax on
the importable good.
Maskin and Newbery (1990) model the behavior of a large importer of oil unable to
commit to future tariffs. Time consistency models of exhaustible resources point out that
scarcity can be artificially induced by the exercise of market power. Suppliers not only
have to make their extraction (and hence their production) decision according to current
prices, but also by comparing anticipated future prices, which will depend on future
levels ofa tariff. In their two period model, if the importer places sufficient weight on
second period consumption of oil, and can revise costlessly the tariff set in the first
period, the welfare associated with the dynamically consistent tariff may be less than the
free-trade welfare level.
Karp and Newbery (1991,1992) build a continuous time model where oligopsonistic
importers choose a time path of tariffs to maximize their domestic welfare. They show
that the open loop strategy is not time consistent. They rely on numerical methods to
illustrate the welfare inferiority of the closed loop solution compared to the open loop
solution. However, they simplify the model so that there is only one large importer. In
that case, there is disadvantageous market power for the importer. In their 1991 paper,
they illustrate the differences between the timeconsistent tariff and the importers' welfare
for different sequential games betweenpolicy active importers and competitiveexporters.
Karp and Perloff (1995) consider the impacts of government commitment on output
subsidies and investment subsidies. This paper differs from theirs because they develop a
model of oligopolistic competition a la Brander-Spencer to help domestic firms gain a
strategic advantage in trade. Output policies based on static models are not altered for a
dynamic model. However, investment decision depends on future as well as current
government policies. If precommitment is not feasible, investment policy is of a limited
strategic use^.
^Other interesting issues of time consistency in intemational trade have been addressed in tlie literature.
Staiger and Tabellinni (1987, 1989) considered tlie credibilit>' issue arising from the use of tariffs as a
redistributive tool. Tomell (1991) and Wriglit (1995) provide explanations for the empirical observation
that future tariff removal is time inconsistent if protectionwas granted to provide incentives for the firms to
reduce their costs. Brainard (1994) stresses tlie time inconsistency problem arisingwhen policymakers are
unable to precoramit to a certain policy in a decliningindustry. All of these papers address redistributive or
second-best issues.
3-Model
Consider a partial equilibrium model. Suppose there are N importing nations with
purchasing power on the world market for a certain good. Their inverse domestic
demand is denoted by )where dj and p- are the domestic demand and domestic
price respectively. Denote the world price and foreign exports from the rest ofthe world
by p and X respectively. The foreign export supply is defined by:X =
where Qijp") and Dip) are the foreign supply and demand respectively. The
superscript e is used to denote producers' price expectations when production decisions
are made. This notation is introduced to model the time consistency issue later in the
paper. Foreign supply depends on the producers' price expectations and hence on their
expectation of the trade policies, whereas foreign demand depends on the realized world
price. This structure gives rise to a foreign export supply curve: X{p^p''). In the case
where production and consumption decisions are carried out simultaneously, p^ =p,
and thus the foreign export supply curve is; ^ip) =Q{p)-D{p). Denote by the
slope of the ex-ante foreign export supplycurve so that -0' -D'.
3.1 Tariffcompetition
If Ti is the ad-valorem tariff imposed by country / on imports, we have the following
arbitrage condition between the domestic and world price: p^ = p(l + ). If qi is the
quantity produced in country /, imports are defined by =
where again the superscript e denotes producers' expectation. From an ex-ante
perspective, = /?., and the slope of the import demand is: n\'Xp^)-d\-q\. World
market equilibrium implies <l>{p) =Y^.ni^(p{\.-^Tj)). For further reference, totally
differentiate this equilibrium condition to obtain:
m,p
<0 (1)
Sufficient conditions for (1) to be negative are to have positively sloped foreign and
domestic supply and negatively sloped foreign and domestic demand. The welfare of
foreign exporters is increasingwith the world price and so decreasing in every tariff. The
objective function of the government in country / is to maximize domestic welfare
defined as the sum of consumer surplus'*, producer surplus and tariff revenue. Domestic
welfare of country / is:
= Pi (y, yy, - p,d, + p,q, - c'(z, )ct, + t,pm, , (2)
0 0
such that di—qi + /w,, and {q. + w,.) = ^(1 + r,.). Rewrite (2) as:
\p,Oi )dy, - c{q,) - pm, (3)
0
To solve for the optimal ex-ante tariff, totally differentiate equation (3). After some
simple manipulations, you get:
dW, =\p, {d,) - c'(9, +\p, {d.) - p]lm, - m,dp (4)
The expression in the first bracket on the right hand-side of (4) is equal to zero absent
government domestic policy since we assume perfect competition in production. The
world price is determined according to the ex-ante residual foreign export supply:
''Consumer surplus is an exact measure of consumer welfare ifdemand is derived from a quasi-linear utility
function.
«>Cp) - Z*"/ ° (5)
Differentiating the behavioral equation in (5), given the other countries' tariff choice,
yields:
- dm^ - 0 (6)
To get the optimal tariff, set equation (4) tozero and substitute (6) in (4) for dnh. Finally,
divide both sides of (4) by dxj to get:
dW,
dr,
-m.
dp _
dX:
= 0 (7)
Assuming that thewelfare fiinction in (3) is strictly concave in its own tariff everywhere,
the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied. Equation (7) implicitly yields the
reaction function of country / as a flinction of its belief about other countries' tariff,
7"/The Nash equilibrium will be the set of tariffs
such that rf = ) andr/ =R{Tf Vij. After some
manipulations, the ex-ante (or precommitment) tariff in elasticity form is:
ri' =
a.
(8)
where =<t>'pl^ is the foreign export supply elasticity with precommitment, a, is
country /'s share ofworld imports, and t]j = -m'jPj jnij is the import demand elasticity
of country j. Therefore, the denominator in (8) represents the elasticity of the residual
foreign export supply curve. If all countries are symmetric, their share ofworld imports
is equal to \IN. As A''-> oo, the optimal policy becomes free trade.
Consider the case where the N countries maximize their joint welfare. Intuitively,
countries will internalize the adverse effect on world price given by the change of other
countries' imports with respect totheir own tariff. The joint welfare of the importers is;
N 'fJ*'"}
j=\ 0 /=! >=*
(9)
Differentiating (9) with respect to p ,qi and nti yields after some manipulations:
= \p,{d,)-c'{q.)\iq.+(p,{d,)-p)dm, (10)
Since the expression equalszero, (10) canbe rewritten as:
dW =T.pdm^-'^,mj<^ • (H)
Differentiating the behavioral equation (5) yields <l>'dp =dm.^. Use this to substitute in
(11) for dntu set (11) to zero to find a maximum, and divide both sides by dxi to yield:
dW
5r,
dp
5r,
= 0 (12)
Solving (12) yields the optimal collusive tariff for importer /. It is
proportional to the inverse of the foreign export supply elasticity, which is the standard
result in the optimal tariff literature. Evaluate (12) at t, - rf to get:
dW
dr.
J*'
5r.-
>0 (13)
Obviously, the choice of instrument does not matter for the collusive and full information case. It can be
readily shown that quotas arid tariffs are equivalent instruments under collusion. Therefore, differentiating
Equation (13) provides the following ranking between the precommitment tariff and
collusive tariff; rf < r*. Countries would be better off acting cooperatively; thus
maximizing theirjoint welfare. In the non-cooperative setting, when a country decreases
its tariff, it fails to consider the reduction in other countries' welfare that is caused by the
ensuing increase in the world price.
3.2 Quota competition
Wewill now restrict the strategy space ofthe N importers to a quota. To do so, set ^ = 0
V j and use imports as the choice variable. The domestic price is determined by;
{Pi) ~%{P^i ) • ex-ante situation, when production decisions are carried out
simultaneously with consumption, p, = pt. The domestic price is then If
domestic imports are the choice variable, the ex-ante residual foreign export supply faced
by country i is defined by;
=0 (14)
Auctioning the quota licenses raises government revenue (p^ - p)ni^. Therefore, country
/'s welfare is still given by (3). Differentiating the residual export supply curve in (14)
given the other countries' quota gives;
(p'dp~dm.=0 (15)
Using (15) to substitute for dp in (4), we get:
dW, ( m, ^^ = (.6)
equation (5),weUeat imports mjJ ^ i, as given.
We assume the welfare function to be concave everywhere in its own imports. Equation
(16) yields the reaction function of country i. The intersection of every countries'
reaction function gives the Nash equilibrium precommitment quota mf. Define Of as the
tariff equivalent measure of the difference between the domestic price and the world
price given mf. From (16), the precommitment tariff equivalent in elasticity form is:
=^ (17)
P ' W
As we mentionedbefore, in the case of collusion, the optimal policy is independent of the
instrument used. The optimal collusive quota ism* and the collusion tariff equivalent of
the import quota in elasticity form is: 0* - r* = l/^'' . It can readily be shown that the
collusion quota is lower than the ex-ante Nash equilibrium quota. Under the strategic
quota game, when a country increases its quantity imported, it fails to consider the
reduction in other countries' welfare that is caused by the ensuing increase in the world
price.
Proposition 1: Assuming symmetry among the policy active importers, the ex~anteNash
equilibrium quota will induce a higher price differential between the domestic price and
the world price than the optimal ex-ante tariff. Moreover, the importer's welfare
associated with the ex-ante quota will be higher than the welfare associated with the
precommitment tariff.
Proof. Evaluating (7) at r. = Of yields:
=-0,'P^,._,yn'A +r,)ldpldr,)<O (18)
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From (1) and because the import demand is negatively sloped, the expression in (18)
provides the following ranking: xf <Q^, given symmetry among policy active
importers. Because tariffs and quotas are equivalent under collusive behavior, we have
the following rankings; < 0? < r* = . Therefore, it must be that the ex-ante quota
brings a higher welfare level than the ex-ante tariff. This is so because domestic welfare
for each country under both Nash equilibria declines as the instrument set under collusion
produces the global optimum for both sets of strategy. QED.
The intuition behind proposition 1 is simple because it is tantamount to the standard
oligopoly theory. By using a tariff as their trade instrument, each country faces a more
elastic residual foreign export supply at the tariff set by the other countries than in the
monopsony case. Moreover, the residual foreign export supply curve will be even more
elastic than under the strategic quota game. When countries use a quota, the Nash
equilibrium will induce a higher welfare than tariffs because countries reducing their
imports by one (differential) unit cause an increase in the world price of pXX). Tariffs
do not have an equivalent effect on the world price, since imports of other countries also
vary following a change in one importer's tariff
The results in proposition 1 contrast with the bilateral monopoly case (two-good, two-
country retaliationworld). The use of a quota in our model does not eliminate trade as in
the Rodriguez's model (1974). In the quota-retaliation framework, each country cannot
enforce a favorable terms oftrade shift. Although both wish to achieve the same level of
trade restriction on a certain good, they have different preferred levels of trade in the
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other good. In our model the foreign exporters are passive. Therefore, competing
importers are able to induce a terms oftrade shift, but this is not optimal because they fail
to take into account (or do not care) about the consequence of their trade policy on the
other policy active importers' welfare. The same basic story applies to the bilateral
monopoly with tariffs as strategic variables. In that situation, it is possible to find an
equilibrium where both countries are worse offthan under free trade. This is ruled out in
our setting since every country gains by imposing a tariff, and importer / gains when
importerj imposes a tariff.
4 - Time consistency of trade policies
This section derives the time consistent trade instrument when there is a lag between
production and consumption decisions. The timing of events is of great importance. We
follow the hypothesis made in Lapan (1988). First, each country announces its tariff
given its own belief about the tariff choice of other countries. Then, production decisions
are made according to price expectations of domestic and foreign producers. Before
consumption decisions (and trade decisions) are made, each government can costlessly
revise the level of its trade instrument set at the beginning of the game. Finally,
consumption decisions are made and trade between countries is carried out.
Because there is a lag between production and consumption and all countries can change
their tariff after production decisions are made, the time consistent tariff is higher than
the precommitment tariff This is so because the ex-post residual foreign export supply
elasticity faced by country i is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. The lack of commitment
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by importers may be collectively beneficial since the ex-posi tariff is bounded below by
the ex-ante tariff. With the perfect foresight assumption, foreign producers fully
anticipate the tariff change after production decisions are made. Since the. fully
anticipated time consistent tariff is large, the lower world price causes a contraction in
production. Therefore, the lack of commitment can increase domestic welfare by off
setting the policy competitionwelfare effect. However, if foreign supply is very elastic,
thus making the residual ex-post export supply elasticity much lower than the ex-ante
elasticity, this potential gain of not committing to a tariff before production decisions are
made can vanish.
4.1 Tariffcompetition
Formally, the slope of the ex-post foreign export supply curve is; = (j>' -Q' = -D'.
Clearly, given output levels, the slope of the foreign export supply is smaller ex-post
than ex-ante if O' >0. Restricting the strategy space to theuse of a tariff, the following
arbitrage condition between the world price and domestic price must hold if imports in
country / are positive: p^ =p{\-\.T.). From an ex-post perspective, i.e. when production
decisions are made: dmjdp. =ni'.+q'.. The welfare fiinction of the government, once
production decisions are made is still defined as in (3). The ex-post residual foreign
export supply is:
(19)
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Totally differentiate (19) given the tariff choice of other countries and producers'
expectations. Assume perfect foresight so that producers correctly anticipate the tariffs
setby governments ex-post, and so Zj ~ rt, p = p'' and = pj •
^dnjf
- dm^ = 0 (20)
Set equation (4) to zero, substitute (20) in (4) for dnii and divide both sides by dzj. After
some manipulations, you get theex-post tariff reaction function implicitly defined by:
dW,
5r..
^iP ''^dn '
-m.
dp _
dr,
= 0 (21)
Xhe tariff reaction function for country / is; =7?(r,,..., r,._,, r-^i,..., , /?) where ^ is a
vector of all other factors in the information set (such as observed domestic and foreign
production levels). Imposing a subgame perfect equilibrium, the time consistent tariff in
elasticity form is; =
a.
Proposition 2; Assuming symmetry among the policy active importers, the time
consistent tariff is higher than the ex-ante tariff. Moreover, the inability to precommit to
the ex-ante tariff may result in a higher welfare ex-post for all importing countries.
Proof. Evaluating (21) at the precommitment solution rt, we get;
dW:
dX:
= Tfp
dp
dr.
>0 (22)
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Equation (22) provides the following ranking between the ex-post and the ex-ante tariffs,
T? < rf. Also, as shown in (13), we have: rj' < r*. Domestic welfare must be lower
under both the ex-ante and ex-post equilibrium tariffs than und^r the collusive tariff,since
the ex-ante collusive tariff yields the global optimum. Since the domestic welfare
function is continuous and monotonic over the interval t,*\ a sufficient condition for
the time consistent tariff to be welfare superior to the ex-ante tariff is for it to fall within
the previous interval. However, a Nash equilibrium resulting in an ex-post tariff set
higher than the collusion ex-ante tariff has an indeterminate effect on domestic welfare
compared to the precommitment tariff. QED.
The intuition behindproposition 2 is the following. The ex-ante Nash equilibrium entails
tariffs set too low compared to the collusive equilibrium. This is so because all countries
face a residual foreign export supply curve which is more elastic due to the tariff
competition between countries. If foreign and domestic production is fixed, the residual
foreign export supply curve is less elastic ex-post, so the ex-post welfare may becloser to
thecollusive ex-ante welfare. However, if foreign production is very elastic, then welfare
can be lower ex-post since the equilibrium ex-post will be far apart from the ex-ante
equilibrium.
4.2 Quota competition
The time consistent quota is derived in a similar way to the time consistent tariff
Imposing a quota on imports is equivalent to setting the domestic price. In this case,
smce ni,=dXPi)-q^{p'), the domestic price is The residual foreign
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export supply curve faced by country i is -m. = 0. Differentiate the
latter expression to get: X^i^,p')-dm^ =0. Perfect foresight implies pi = pi and
p^ =p . Setting equation (4) to zero after appropriate substitutions implicitly yields the
quota reaction fiinction m': = Imposing a subgame
perfect equilibrium, the time consistent tariff equivalent quota in elasticity form can be
written as:
=^ (23)
dm, X- ' ' p ^
Proposition 3: Assuming symmetry among the policy active importers, the time
consistent quota is lower than, the precommitment quota. It induces a higher price
differential between the domestic price and the world price ex-post than in the ex-ante
case. Moreover, the inability to precommit to the ex-ante quota may be collectively
welfare improving for all importing countries.
Proof: Evaluating (23) at the precommitment solutionmf, we get:
dW
dm,
nil
m[
f-Q'
- <
P,-P-Y
Equation (24) gives the following ranking between the ex-ante Nash equilibrium quota
and the time consistent ex-post quota, mt < mf. Similarly to the case of tariffs, the
iPlzM. (24)
f-2'
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incapability to precommit to a quota can be welfare improving since we have proved the
following rankings; mf >m] and mf >m'; and that the ex-ante collusive quota yields
the global optimum. The world market structure in our model implies that the quantity
imported in each country is too large ex-ante. Since ex-post, the residual foreign export
supply is less elastic, each country will import a smaller quantity. QED.
Proposition 4: Assuming symmetric policy active importers who cannot precommit to a
trade policy, the time consistent tariffis notnecessarily an inferior instrument to the time
consistent quota. The ranking between the two instruments is generally indeterminate.
Proof: The ranking of the time consistent quota and tariff involves the ranking of two
second best policies. But clearly, because:
dr.
then Xi < 9i. Thus, in the case where xf > r/*, tariffs are welfare superior to quotas
because the optimal ex-post tariff is in the interval [6* , Ofl . This is more likely to
happen when foreign demand elasticities are very small and/or foreign supply elasticities
are very large. QED.
5 - A Numerical Example
This section tries to illustrate the welfare implications of the precommitment and time
consistent trade instrument discussed in propositions 1 to 4. Suppose domestic
ct x*"preferences are represented by a quasi-linear utility fijnction; U{w^,x^) = w^ +——-
h 2b
17
—o:p
% Sp, dr.
<0,
where >v, is a numeraire good. These preferences implies the domestic demand (di) for
good Xi is: d- =a- bp., where a and bare positive constants andp, is the domestic price.
Domestic producers ofthe importable good in country / have the following cost function;
c • •q . Competitive domestic markets imply thedomestic supply function is:
' 2g g
=c +gp., where g- is a positive constant. Assume for simplicity the available policy is
a specific tariff^, so that p. = p + . The import demand function of country / is then:
m. =a-c-(b +g)(p +t.).
Thewelfare fiinction for country / is the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and
tariff revenue:
qi+mj / \ j2 ^2
i b J b lb 2g g
such that d.=q.+m.. The export supply curve of the rest of the world is:
X{p,p'')-0{p^)-D{p) = {6-a)-\-At the level p" =p, so ex-
ante foreign export supply curve is: <l>{p) ={5-a)+{p-\-Y)p • World equilibrium
w _ _ _ N{a-c)-{d-a)-{_b +g)(^J-)
implies / w. =^(/?). Solving for p yields; p = .
The first order condition of the strategic tariff game can be rewritten as
tXdmJdt,) =/w.(^/5/-). Therefore, the reaction function for country / is implicitly
defined by:
®In our model, proposition 1to4 still hold ifUie strategy space is restricted tospecific tarifTs instead ofad-
valorem tariffs. However, specific tariffs and ad-valorem tariffs are not equivalent instruments. The use of
a specific tariff is uniquely to facilitate tlie computation of the numerical example in tliis section.
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- ?, = T— ^ TTT: Tn + (p+c)
^P + y^ +Nib + gc)
Af(a - c) - (<J - a) - (i + 'j
{{P+r) +N{b +g))-
(26)
Imposing symmetry among the importing countries, the intersection of the reaction
functions solves for the ex-ante Nash equilibrium. To simplify the derivation of further
results, rescale the following parameters: a =a'N,6 =S'N^P-= p'N and y =y'N.
Moreover, define X=^ and ^ . The precommitment
{b^g) (b +g)
optimal tariff is:
t" = d (27)
' X(2 +X) +{,N-l)(\ +X)-
The optimal collusive tariff is given by maximizing the sum of theN countries' welfare.
This gives a set of N first order conditions of the type:
Because of the symmetrybetween the countries, /,• = tj. The solution is:
/•= ^ (28)
' X{2 + X)
We have expressed the precommitment tariff as a deviation fi-om the collusive tariff.
Both tariffs have the same numerator and only differ in their denominator. It is readily
seen that ifA^> 1, </*, because (A''-I)(l + /^)' >0. The latter expression illustrates
the theoretical result of equation (13). The collusive tariff is higher than the non-
cooperative precommitment tariff
19
The time consistent tariff is found by maximizing:
where represents domestic production given the trade policy expectation of producers
in country /. From the government's perspective, production is fixed. In this case,
Na + a-Q''
p = — — and m = a- bt. - - bp . The first order condition
^ Nb +/3
is; =m^{^ldt-Y Imposing perfect foresight implies , t": and
q] =c+gp,.. The implicit reaction fiinction ofcountry / is: t. - l)b +fi) =tn..
For fiirther reference, define the following two parameters // =—^— g 0,1 and
h^g •
_ B' \ ^ _ . .
// ~ —T ^ parameters // and // can be interpreted as the relative domestic
and foreign demand responsiveness respectively. Using the symmetry across countries,
the optimal time consistent tariff is:
A
f- - (30)
' X{2 +X) +{\ +X){X{NJi -\) +{,N-\)ju)
Using equations (27), (28) and (30), we can illustrate the point made in proposition 2.
Because we used linear domestic and foreign demand and supply with a quadratic cost
function, it should be clear that the welfare function of country / is a quadratic function.
The welfare function reaches a maximum at t* and is symmetric around that point. With
those properties, we show that the inability to precommit to the ex-ante tariff increases
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welfare for an importer ifthe following inequality holds: // <t] +(?- - if). The
first inequality is ensured by proposition 2. The second inequality holds if;
A' =[A(2 +>^) +2{N -1)(1 +Xf tX{NJi -1)+(^'-1)//]+ - \)X(2 +X){\ +>^) >0-
The inability to commit to the specific tariff is collectively beneficial for the policy active
importers if the inequality above is satisfied. Clearly, if = 1, A' <0 implying
precommitment is desirable. ForiV> 1, a sufficient condition for A' to be greater than
zero is for Ji>\IN because then If <t^ </• . The only remaining question is what if
> t*. Since A' is increasing in N, the likelihood that the inability to precommit is
beneficial increases with N. Fixing N = 1 and X= becomes; 22^-t-I I//-5 > 0 .
Thus, for not very high relative foreign and domestic demand responsiveness, the
collective inability to commit to the ex-ante specific tariff increases welfare for policy
active importers.
In the case of a strategic quota game, rri] is the choice variable. Since d. = + w., for
the precommitment case, domestic market equilibrium implies: =——-—Solving
b + g
for the inverse ex-ante foreign export supply gives: p^X) =^ H Maximizing
/9 + r
domestic welfare in (25), the first order condition is: p- -p = p'ni., where p' is the
derivative of the inverse foreign export supply with respect to imports in country /.
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If the policy active importers can precommit to their policy, the quota reaction function
, ^ , , a-c~m. 777,.
of country i is then implicitly deiined by: —; = r •
^ . b+g fi + r fi +r
Imposing symmetry between the countries allows to solve for the optimal Nash
equilibrium quota: =~—^+S) equivalent is given
iN + l)ib + g) + {/3+ r)
by: Of = Pi -p. With various simplemanipulations, one finds;
Bt = ^ (31)
' /l(2 + >i) + (JV-l)A(l + A)
Note that equations (27) and (31) give the same optimal tariff when A'^ = 1. This shows
the equivalency result between quotas and tariffs in case of a single large country.
However, following proposition 1, if A^> <0 '^ since (A^-l)((l +>^)^ -A,{\ +A.)) =
(N -1)(1 + /I) > 0; and quotas are welfare superior to tariffs. In the collusive case, the
choice of tariff or quota is irrelevant and thus, the tariff equivalent 0' is equal to in
equation (28).
Finally, the time consistent quota is derived by assuming production is fixed. The price
in importing countries is: /?,. =(a--q^)/b. Similarly, the foreign inverse export
supply world is; = + -Q")//^> and the world price is determined such
that X = . The first order condition implicitly defines the quota reaction fimction
for country /: J3{a-m. - q^)-b{a +X-0)= . Imposing perfect foresight and
symmetry among the N countries gives;
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/3\(a - c){fi+ r) - (« - +g)
m, =
+r)+(N+\){r + fi){b+g)- Nr{b+g)
equivalent is:
,9.^= (32)
' A(2+ >^) + (^-l)(l +A)A
The time consistent tariff
Again, because wehave expressed equations (31) and (32) in terms of deviation from the
optimal collusive tariffequivalent, we can easily illustrate proposition 3. The importers'
collective inability to precommit to their trade policy will be welfare improving if the
following inequality holds: 0/' <6^ <0' +(0' -9.^). The first inequality in the latter
expression always holds for /7 < 1. The second inequality holds if:
=[2N(l +X)- aYnjJ-1)+ (2 +Jl)(N -1) >0 (33)
If you set then < 0, and the inability to precommit to the ex-ante quotahurts the
large country [Lapan (1988)]. For A'" 9^1, note that (33) is independent of the parameter
//. This means that domestic demand and supply do not play a role in the ex-posi versus
ex-anie welfare analysis in the strategic quota game. Further note that A^ is an increasing
function of JI. The inability to precommit to the ex-ante quota is more likely to be
welfare improving the higher the foreign exporters relative demand responsiveness is. A
sufficient condition for the inequality to hold is that: 1/A^, because then: G^<0*.
The sign of /dN is ambiguous. The likelihood that the inability to precommit is
beneficial increases with (A^ is increasing in AO as long as Ji>XI{A-¥ 3/1).
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Assuming commitnient is not feasible, (30) and (32) can beused to compare tariffs and
•quotas. Clearly if 0^ <t' \jiN >l], then quotas'dominate tariffs; comparably, if >/*
then tariffs dominate quotas (for (NJI-\) +{N<0). Thus the ambiguity-arises
only for . Using the same reasoning as earlier, tariffs will dominate quotas if
and only if 6^ -1* >t* - . Hence, tariffs are superior to quotas ifand only if A"^ <0
where:
A'" =((iV77-l)(l +;i))[(iV-l)/; +A(iV;u-l)]+(2 +;i) <0
Finally, in some extreme cases, an importing country can end up worse off than if it had
no market power at all on the world market. In the case of tariffs, the condition is: ,
2(N - 1)m + +A)+ Jl^ {Nji -1) < 0 (34)
The inequality in (34) implies the policy active importerswould collectively be better off
if they had precommitted not to free trade. In the quota game, market power is
collectively disadvantageous if: X]JN{2 + X)+A' {JiN -1) < 0.
6 - Concluding Remarks and Extensions
We have shown that tariffs and quotas are not equivalent protection instruments in a
strategic setting where importing countries have purchasing power on the world market
over a certain good. Each policy active importer would be better off by colluding and
setting their trade instrument cooperatively. If production lags are present, the ex-arUe
optimal policy is not time consistent because the ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign
export supply curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. However, we have shown that
the importers' inability to precommit to their trade instrument may be welfare superior to
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the precommitment solution. The negative welfare implication of non-cooperative
behavior may be balanced off by the welfare effect of the ex-post elasticity. Given the
structure of the world market, these conclusions extend to any dynamic framework in
which some inputs are committed before trade decisions are made. The political reasons
why the government does not, or cannot, precommit itself to a predetermined policy is
not the focus of the paper. However, it could very well be an interesting exercise to
explain the precommitment incapability of the importers.
An interesting extension to our model would be to modify the time consistency game to
include another stage. Suppose that the timing of economic decisions is modified as
follows: First, governments of the policy active countries announce a tax/subsidy it will
pay domestic producers as well as the tariff rate. Next, domestic and foreign production
is made according to producer's price expectations. Assuming precommitment is not
feasible, each policy active government can revise the tariff rate or the production
tax/subsidy. Finally, consumption decisions and trade are carried out. Lapan (1988) has
shown that, with a single large country, the optimal production policy is a tax on
domestic production of the importable. The purpose is to signal foreign producers to
increase their production. If it were possible, a government would want to assure foreign
producers they will not exploit the lower ex-post elasticity once production is made.
The first question to answer is if there exists such a production tax and/or subsidy which
would increase welfare for the importers. Assuming they behave non-cooperatively, if
we allow the importers the opportunity to use a production policy, it may very well be
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that they will end up worse offthan had they not been allowed tomove before production
decisions were made inthe first place. In this situation, finding the cooperative solution
could be interesting. It may seem odd at first to suppose importers set their production
policy cooperatively, and that we later restrict their trade policy to be set non-
j'
cooperatively. However, this is not as strange as itmay seem. In practice, there are some
issues on which binding agreements are easily enforced, facilitating cooperation, while
for other issues, the lack of any credible enforcement mechanism makes the nature of any
interaction fundamentally non-cooperative [Burbidge e/ al. (1997)].
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